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'Ihis rejoinder was written 'While I was a consultant at the
World Bank, DRIME. I would like to thank Matthew Shapiro
for helpful discussions, without in any way implicating him
in style or substance.
Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical co:mrnent.
References in publications to Discussion Papers should be
cleared with the authors to protect the tentative character
of.these papers.

Abstract

In an earlier paper "Granger-causality and Policy Effectiveness,"
Economica [1984] 1 I showed that for a policy instrument x to
Granger-cause some target variable y is not necessary for x to be useful
in controlling y.

(The argument that it is not sufficient was already

familiar, e.g. from the work of Sargent).

Using a linear rational

expectations model I showed that x would fail to Granger-cause y (while
y did, in some cases, Granger-cause x) if x were set by a variety of
optimal, time-consistent or ad hoc policy feedback rules.

Yet in all

the examples, x was an effective policy instrument.
In response to some comments by Professor Granger, I now show that
my earlier results are unaffected when the following 3 concessions to
"realism" are made:
1.

Controllers do not have perfect control of the instruments (this
was already allowed for in my earlier paper).

2.

Governments may use a different information set to determine
instruments than that used by the public.

3.

The controller may not have perfect specifications and estimates of
models of the economy.
The analysis confirms that Granger-causality tests are

uninformative about the presence, absence, degree or kind of policy
(in)effectiveness.
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In my (1984) paper, "Granger-c ausality and Policy Effectivene ss," I
argued that "Granger-ca usality" is unnecessary and insufficien t for policy
effectivene ss.

Since it was already well-establ ished that the fact that a

policy instrument x Granger-cau sed some economic variable y, did not imply
that x could be used to control or influence y (see e.g. Sargent [1976]), my
paper focused on the case where x does not Granger-cau se y yet can be used to
influence or control y.

I established this in the context of linear rational

expectation s models with known, constant coefficient s, by demonstrati ng that x
would fail to Granger-cau se y (while y did, in some cases Granger-cau se x) if
x were set by a variety of optimal, time-consis tent or ad-hoc (stochastic or
non-stochas tic) linear feedback rules.
an effective policy instrument:

Yet in all the examples chosen, x was

different values of xt (different

realization s of xt) were cet par. associated with different values of Yt+i
(different realization s of Yt+i> i

~

O, and different (linear feedback) rules

governing x did generate different conditional and/or uncondition al
distributio n functions for y.
In his response to my paper professor Granger (1986) does not dispute
that the examples I gave were correct.

Rather than attacking the logic of my

argument, its relevance is denied:

"However, the framework considered by Buiter is academic,
sterile and quite unrealistic and is thus a very special
situation. To make it more realistic three further items
need considerati on:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

controllers do not have perfect control of the
instruments ,
governments may use a different information set
It to determine instruments than that used by
the public, a , to form expectation s and to
anticipate inttrumenta l variables, and
economy controllers in practice do not have
perfectly formed specificatio ns and estimates
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of models of the economy ••• , they do not have
a consistent or clear-cut value for the target
or desired values for endogenous variables and
they do not have a specific cost function,
•••• They may thus appear to be behaving
irrationally or sub-optimally by a public using
a different model, a different information set
and an assumed set of targets and cost
functions." (Granger [1986], pp. 7-8).

I shall show that Professor Granger's points (i), (ii) and (iii) are
irrelevant for the issue of the informativeness concerning policy
effectiveness of Granger-causality tests.

This will be done using his own

suggested modifications of my formal framework.
In my (1984) paper, the model of the economy was that given in (1).

(1)

AY

t- 1

+ B E(Y

1

t+ 1

1n t- 1 )

+ B E(Y
2
t

In t- 1 )

+ext+ b

t

+ u

t

Yt is a vector of state, target or endogenous variables, xt a vector of
instruments, bt a vector of exogenous variables and ut a white noise
disturbance vector assumed to be orthogonal both to the private sector's
information set

Q

t- 1

and to the public sector's information set I

t-1·

Eis

the mathematical expectation operator.
For simplicity and notational economy, and because none of Professor
Granger's objections to my paper are affected by it, I shall in this rejoinder
purge the model of expectations and exogenous variables, i.e. B
1

O.
is

= B2 = bt

=

Therefore, the model of the economy (Professor Granger's "plant equation")

FR-029/DPR/08-13-86

3

Inside Lags and Outside Lags
Professor Granger objects to the notion of an instantaneous,
immediate or contemporaneous effect of x on Y.

"[Because of the timing question, the usual notion of xt
causing Yt' with lags inherent in the definition of
causation, will here be denoted as xt-l causing yt]"
(Granger [1986], p. 3).

I consider it unnecessarily restrictive to rule out instantaneous effects from
xt on Yt' since automatic (fiscal) stabilizers are assumed to work in
precisely that manner, but in the interest of maximizing the common ground I
would be quite happy to grant Professor Granger a lag, 1n which case equation
(2) becomes:

(2 I)

Yt = AY t- l + Bx t- l + u t

Professor Granger's arguments about timing appear, however, to
confuse what in the economic policy literature have long been called "inside
lags" and "outside lags" in the policy process.

The inside lag is the lag

between the period, t say, in which an instrument value xt is realized and the
first period, t - ,.,
1

T.

1

~

0 say, in which the full information I

t-,.1

was

available on which the controller based his or her decision concerning xt.
The inside lag reflects the many sources of delay in the policy design and
implementation process.
The outside lag 1s the minimal lag, ,

0

~

0 say, between the period 1n

which a value for the control 1s realized, t - , , say, and the period in
0
which it has its first effect on the endogenous variable, t.

In equation (2)
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the outside lag 1s O, in equation (2') it is 1.
specified yet.
may help.

The inside lag hasn't been

In equations (3a, b) below it is 1.

A non-economic example

Lett be the period 1n which the French government explodes an H

bomb; t-i, i

~

0 the period in which the decision was taken to explode that

bomb in period t, or the period with the most recent information that was
still reflected in the decision to stage the explosion a½ t; and t+j, J
the first period in which the fallout reaches Australia.

~

0

Here j is the

outside lag and i the inside lag.
In his rejection of instantaneous causation, Professor Granger seems
to argue for a minimal outside lag of one period.

He also appears to argue in

favor of (at least) a one period inside lag, since, using his notation, xt is
specified as:

where et is white noise with respect to the information set It-l"

et is a

policy implementation error.

The final equation Professor Granger appears to favor does, however,
not appear to have any outside lag.

Since my results concerning Granger

causality and policy effectiveness hold for any inside and/or outside lags, I
am happy to follow Professor Granger's lead here and to use equations (2) and
(3a, b) rather than (2') and (3a, b).

FR-029/DPR/08-13-86
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Granger-causality and Policy Effectiveness in a "Realistic" Setting
Private agents in period t have the information set Qt which contains
Yt-i and xt-i' i

~

O.

The government 1n period t has the information set

It, which contains Yt-i' xt-i and zt-i' i ~ O.
information available to the government.

zt 1s the vector of extra

Let Y~ _ (y~, z~).

Yt 1s governed

by equation (2) or, partitioning all vectors and matrices conformably,

(4)

=

+

u' = [u' u' ] is a white noise disturbance vector.
t
lt 2t

X

t

+

It 1s orthogonal to Q

t- 1

and therefore also to It-l
The policy_ rule is given by (3a,b), where et 1s orthogonal to It-l
(but not necessarily to Q

t- 1

).

Furthermore, using my own notation,

e~-l 1s orthogonal to It-l (but not necessarily to Qt_ ).
1

It reflects

"uncertain and changing policy objectives."
Equation (5) can also be rewritten as 1n equation (7) of Granger
(1986).

(6b)

E

t-1

=

E

1

t-1

+

FR-029/DPR/08-13-86

6

where

(6c)

e"

t-1 = g(I t- l' t-1) - f(g t- l' t-1)

e"
reflects the extra information available to the government.
t-1

It is

orthogonal to It-l but not necessarily to nt-l"
It's obviously true that if the public estimates an equation such as
(4) from just the Yt and wt or xt, then the instrument vector generated by
(3a,b) and (5) or by (3a,b) and (6a,b,c) will contain information about the zt
that are unobserved by the public.

Granger causality tests involving just y

and x may therefore incorrectly attribute the incremental predictive power
over y of the omitted variables z to the x variables.

The term "incorrectl y"

in the previous sentence means incorrectly as Granger-cau sality tests, that is
incorrectly as tests of "incrementa l predictive content" [Schwert (1979)].
Even if this familiar omitted variables problem is absent, correctly conducted
Granger-ca usality tests will not be informative about the government 's scope
for influencing or controlling the Yt (or Yt) through the xt. ,
This becomes clear once we do the Granger-ca usality test correctly
For simplicity, let the g(I

t- 1

, t-1) function in (5) be a

time-invari ant linear function G of Yt~l' i.e.

where G is a constant matrix and e~-l 1s orthogonal to {Yt-i' i ~ l}.
relevant system of equations for informed Granger-ca usality testing is

The

FR-029/DPR/08-13-86
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Yt =[A+ CG]Y t- l + C[e' l + e ] + ut
tt

(9)

By assumption, ut, e~-l and et are all orthogonal to It-l' i.e.
orthogonal to Yt-t•

Simple inspection will confirm the following:

(i)

controllers do not have perfect control of the instruments (as evidenced by
the presence in (8) and (9) of et); (ii) governments may use a different
information set from that used by the public [xt may feed back from zt-l which
is not contained in Ot_ ) and (iii) governments may have uncertain and
1
changing policy objectives (e~~l is present in (8) and (9)).

Nevertheless, x

will fail to Granger-cause Y while, unless C = O, x does influence Y and can
be used to control Y.

In addition, in this example, Y will Granger-cause x.

Paraphrasing the introduction to my (1984) paper, equations (8) and (9)
demonstrate that, if the value of a vector of endogenous variables is a
function of current, past, and/or expected future values of a vector of policy
instruments, and if the instruments are functions of current and/or lagged
values of the endogenous variables (plus white noise), then the instruments
won't Granger-cause the endogenous variables even though changing the policy
rule may alter the dependence of the endogenous variables on their own lagged
values and on the exogenous variables.

Conclusions
There are important practical issues and even some moderately deep
conceptual issues involved in first defining and then measuring policy
effectiveness.

Even in models without forward-looking rational expectations,
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policy effectiveness is a multi-dimensional concept.

First one should specify

the precise nature of the change in the policy rule that is being considered
(whether it is a change in the known value of a coefficient in a policy
feedback rule; a change 1n the variance of the disturbance term in the policy
rule, etc.).

Second, one should determine the exact nature of the changes in

the joint distribution functions of the endogenous or target variables that
result from the policy rule change.

Does the change in the policy rule alter

these conditional or unconditional means of these variables, their conditional
or unconditional variances and covariances, etc.?
In models with forward-looking rational expectations, the
counterfactual to the policy experiment must be specified carefully.
"Effective relative-to-what?" is not answered very easily.

In the most

general case the counterfactual is to be thought of along the lines of the
following thought experiment.

Consider two economic systems, identical in all

respects except for the policy rule.

This policy rule may be open-loop and

non-stochastic, open-loop stochastic, closed loop with only additive
uncertainty or closed-loop with more general uncertainty such as random
multiplicative parameters.

Economic agents are endowed with more or less

accurate subjective priors over current and future policy behavior, which they
may update sequentially, say in Bayerian fashion, as new realizations of the
policy variables are observed.

"Changes in policy" here means different

drawings from the "objective" policy instrument rule distribution function.
Policy effectiveness is measured by differences in the realizations or
distribution functions of the endogenous target variables when different
drawings are made from the policy instrument rule distribution function.
This is a-historical, "alternative universes" counterfactual is not
1n fact different from the "historical counter-factual" which economists often

FR-029/DPR/08-13-86
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appear to have in mind when discussing economic policy.

The historical

counterfactual asks about the consequence of changing a policy rule at a point
1n time rather than about differences between target variable behavior when
there are differences between the policy rules during one or more periods in
two otherwise identical universes.

To analyse the consequences of a change 1n

the policy rule at t' we must known when and to what extent this change was
anticipated by private and government agents, the degree to which it was
perceived as permanent or transitory and the degree of confidence with which
these expectations were held.

Providing all this information amounts to

constructing the a-historical counterfactual.
This rejoinder has amplified what I established 1n my 1984 paper:
Granger-causality tests.are no~ in any way useful or relevant for establishing
the presence or absence of policy effectiveness, even when all the technical
problems associated with conducting these tests properly are absent or
resolved (including any missing variables problems).

For instance, if

monetary and fiscal variables do not Granger-cause some real or nominal
variables (such as GDP, the inflation rate or the exchange rate) this has no
implications as regards the ability of the monetary and fiscal authorities to
use these monetary and fiscal variables to control the economy.

If the

exchange rate does not Granger-cause the price level this does not mean that a
devaluation won't raise the price level.
Ironically, a well-known paper by Professor Granger [1980] contains
in consecutive paragraphs two statements, the first of which reflects the same
confusion that prompted his response to my paper, while the second is correct.
The (incorrect) first statement occurs after a brief discussion of
exogeneity.

FR-029/DPR/08-13-86
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"One can argue that a government controlled interest rate
is in fact partly determined by previous movements
elsewhere in the economy, and so is not strictly
exogenous. The true exogenous part of such a variable 1s
that which cannot be forecast from other variables and
its own past, and it follows that it is only this part
that has any policy impact." (Granger [1980), p. 350,
italics added).

The non-sequitur 1n the last sentence parallels Professor Granger's
misunderstanding of the relation between testing for Granger-causality and for
policy effectiveness.
For a policy variable or instrument to have impact or be effective,
it 1s neither necessary nor sufficient that a change in the rule governing the
instrument makes the actual behavior of the target variables different from
what was expected •. Rather, both actual and expected behavior.should be
different from what they would have been absent the change in the rule.

It 1s

perfectly sensible, e.g. to analyze policy (in)effectiveness issues using a
deterministic model.

Granger-causality tests of course only make sense in

non-deterministic models.
The (correct) second statement occurs immediately following the
first.

"It is also worth pointing out that controllability is a
deeper property than causality, in my opinion, although
writers have confused the two concepts. If Y causes X,
does not necessarily mean that Y can be used to control
(Granger, 1980, p.351).

much
some
it
X. 11

Both my paper and this rejoinder are no more than amplifications of this
statement.
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